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The American population is aging rapidly. Persons 65 years of age and older, 
who now constitute about one-fifth of the population, will constitute about two- 
fifths of the population by 2040. In addition, individuals are living longer. Yet 
the labor force participation rate of older Americans has fallen dramatically in 
recent years. This paper discusses this trend and the principal explanations put 
forth to explain it. The paper is in two parts. The first part reviews trends in 
labor force participation and associated trends in Social Security (SS) cover- 
age, firm pension plan coverage, and other factors that are likely to be associ- 
ated with the labor force participation trends. The second part of the paper 
discusses the incentive effects of  SS and retirement plans, with emphasis on 
firm pension plans. The intent is to summarize the facts and the research that 
has attempted to explain them. The presentation is primarily graphic. We begin 
with a simple conceptual framework. 
1.1  A Conceptual Framework 
To help organize the discussion that follows and to put the ideas in context, 
a conceptual framework of the retirement decision is outlined in figure 1.1, 
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Fig. 1.1  Summary of factors that influence retirement 
which  summarizes several stylized facts.'  Several factors have important in- 
fluences on the retirement decision as workers age. As health and functional 
ability deteriorate, the disutility of work increases, and the relative desire for 
leisure increases, indicated by the line labeled L in the figure. Real wage earn- 
ings typically rise over some portion of the working life but later decline with 
age, as indicated by  W! Lower wage earnings and greater hardship associated 
with working tend to increase the incentive to retire. As employees age, they 
may also accumulate more personal saving, and their entitlement to SS and 
firm pension benefits increases. Thus, if the retirement age is postponed, em- 
ployees are able to support a higher level of consumption after retirement. In 
addition, any given level of personal saving or SS and pension entitlement can 
support a higher annual consumption level if retirement is postponed; there are 
fewer remaining years of life over which support must be provided. This is 
summarized as B in the figure. The larger these benefits, the greater the incen- 
tive to retire. 
The central theme of the discussion below is the upward  shift over time in 
the relation between benefits and age; given age, SS and pension entitlements 
have increased. Thus, the incentive to retire has increased. With respect to most 
of the discussion below, it may be assumed that the relation between real wage 
earnings and age and the relation between the disutility of  work (desire for 
leisure) and age have not changed over time. 
Worker productivity also declines with age. It is often argued that productiv- 
ity is greater than the wage early in the working life and less than the wage 
later in the working life. This is the assumption reflected  in the relation be- 
tween worker productivity, P, and the wage shown in the figure. This relation 
is often put forth as an explanation for the structure of private pension plans, 
which typically encourage early retirement, as discussed below. 
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Fig. 1.2  Death rates for men and women, selected ages, by year 
1.2  Life Expectancy, Labor Force Participation, and Associated Trends 
1.2.1  Life Expectancy and the Age Composition of the U.S. Population 
Americans are living longer, and the proportion of the population that is old 
is increasing rapidly. In 1950, for example, the annual death rate of  white men 
age 75-79  was 90.1 per 1,000; by  1980, it had fallen to 80.7, a  10 percent 
reduction. Assuming current trends, the projected death rate for the year 2000 
is 63.9, a further 21 percent reduction. The reductions for white women are 
even larger, as shown in figure 1  .2.2 
An  implication of the lower death rates is a marked increase in life expec- 
tancy, especially for women. Men who were 65 in  1950 could expect to live 
12.8 more years; in 1980 they could expect to  live  14.2 more years, an  11 
percent increase (see fig. 1.3A). Over the same thirty-year period, the life ex- 
pectancy of women who were 65 increased by over 23 percent, from 15 to 18.5 
more years (see fig. 1.3B). 
The overall aging of the population probably has more important policy im- 
plications than increasing individual life e~pectancy.~  The proportion of  the 
population 55 and older has increased from about 15 percent in 1940 to about 
21 percent in  1980. By 2020, almost 31 percent of  the population will be in 
this age group (see fig. 1.4A). The elderly (those over 54), who now constitute 
2. These data were taken from Poterba and Summers (1987), who obtained their data from the 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and We1fareKJ.S. Department of Health and Human Ser- 
vices, National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics  ofthe Unifed  States, vol. 2, Mortuliry 
(Washington, D.C., 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980). 
3. Data for figs.  1.4A and  1.4B are taken from Sandefur and Tuma (1987, table  1)  and U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1984, table 6). 10  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
Fig. 1.3A  Life expectancy of men at selected ages, by year 
Fig. 1.3B  Life Expectancy of women at selected ages, by year 
about one-fifth of  all adults, will constitute about two-fifths of  all adults by 
2040. 
The oldest age groups are growing the fastest. Only 0.3 percent of the popu- 
lation was  over 85 in  1940; the proportion had increased to 1.0 percent by 
1980, mostly since 1960 (see fig. 1.4B). The projected proportion is 2.4 in 
2020. The proportion between 65 and 74 increased from about 5 percent of the 
population in  1940 to close to 7 percent in  1980; the 2020 projection is 10 
percent. Thus, an increasingly large fraction of  the population is older than 
typical retirement ages. As emphasized below, the dramatic reduction in retire- 
ment ages magnifies this effect. 
From the point of view of  the individual, increasing life expectancy induces 
later retirement. If other factors remain the same, longer life expectancy means 11  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
Percent 
0'  1  ,I 
1910  1930  1960  1970  1990  2010  2030  2060  2070 
Year 
Fig. 1.4A 
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Age composition of the U.S. population (1910-80) and projections 
Percent 
1910  1930  1950  1970  1990  2010  2030  2050  2070 
Year 
Fig. 1.4B  Age composition of the U.S. population over 55 (1910-80) and 
projections (199O-2080), selected age groups 
that any given level of pension and SS entitlement, or of personal saving, must 
be used to support consumption over more retirement years. From the point of 
view of society, a larger older population means that a smaller labor force must 
support a larger number of retirees. 
1.2.2  Labor Force Participation 
Although a larger and larger fraction of the population is old and individual 
life expectancy is increasing, workers are leaving the labor force at younger 
and younger ages. Thus, there are more older people, living longer, working 
less. 
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Fig. 1.5A  Labor force participation of men over 60, 1870-1980 
ticipation rates of  men over 60 were essentially constant between 1870 and 
1930. Indeed, according to their study, for most older age groups the rates in 
1937 were essentially the same as in  1930. Since that time, the labor force 
participation rates of older men have fallen continuously. Adjusted for the shift 
away from agricultural employment, the rate increased from a little over 50 
percent in 1870 to almost 65 percent in 1930 and then fell to about 30 percent 
by  1980. Social Security was introduced under the Social Security Act of 1935. 
Company pensions were spurred by the Revenue Act of  1942, which granted 
tax incentives to firms to establish pension plans. The Ransom and Sutch data, 
based on the decennial censuses, are reproduced in figure 1 SA. 
These data, as reported in Sandefur and Tuma (1987), have also been used 
to construct labor force participation rates by  age group for men and women 
at ten-year intervals, beginning in 1940 (figs. 1.5B-D).4 The rates for men fell 
in each age group. For example, 61.4 percent of  men  55 and older were in 
the labor force in  1940, by  1970 the proportion had fallen to 52.7, and by 
1985 only 39.6 percent of men in this age group were in the labor force. The 
participation rates of  women 55 and older increased until  1970. But, since 
4.  Labor force participation  by  gender and age group can be computed from Sandefur and 
TumaS (1987) tables 1, 2, 3, and 10. For example, the labor force participation of men in a given 
age category is equal to the percentage of men in that age group who are employed divided by the 
percentage of  men  in  that age group (which is given in table 3, panel a). Since the tables are 
divided by gender and race simultaneously, the percentage of employed men in a given age group 
is the percentage of white employed men in that age group plus the percentage of  nonwhite em- 
ployed men in that age group. For each race, the percentage of employed men in an age group is 
the product of the following: the percentage of men of a given race and age that is employed, the 
percentage of  tiie population of  a given race and age that is male, and the percentage of a given 
age that is a specific race. This information is obtained from tables 10, 3, and 2, respectively. To 
aggregate age groups, additional information regarding the percentage of the population that is a 
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Fig. 1.5C  Labor force participation of men 55 and older, by age group, 
1940-85 
1970, even  the  rates  for  women  have  fallen  (see  fig.  1.5B). Indeed,  for 
both  men  and  women  there was  an abrupt change in  labor force partici- 
pation  rates in  the early  1970s: for men  the reduction was  accelerated in 
most age groups, and for women the rates that had been increasing began to 
decline. 
1.2.3  Associated Trends 
What has enabled people to leave the labor force at younger and younger 
ages and still maintain consumption after retirement? It seems evident that this 
has been made possible by Social Security benefits and by firm pension plans. 
Before discussing trends in SS and pension coverage, it is useful to establish 
first that support in old age is typically not financed by personal saving. 14  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.6A  Median wealth by age and asset category, all households 
The Composition of  Total Wealth 
Based on the recent  Survey of  Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
Venti and Wise (1991) have computed the composition of total wealth for all 
households, for homeowners, and for renters in 1984. The results are summa- 
rized in figures 1.6A-C. The amounts reflect median wealth by asset category. 
It is clear from figure  1.6A that most families approach retirement age with 
very  little personal  saving  other than  housing  equity.  For example,  among 
households with heads 60-65,  the median of liquid wealth is only $6,600; the 
median of housing equity is $43,000.5 The majority of families rely heavily on 
5. Liquid wealth is broadly defined to include interest-eming assets held in banks and other 
institutions, mortgages held, money owed from the sale of businesses, US.  savings bonds, check- 
ing accounts, and equity in stocks and mutual fund shares, less unsecured debt. 15  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
Fig. 1.6B  Median wealth by age and asset category, homeowners 
Fig. 1.6C  Median wealth by age and asset category, renters 
Social Security  benefits  for support after retirement  and, to a more limited 
extent,  on the saving that is done for them by  employers, through  defined- 
benefit pension plans. The SIPP data, from which these figures were computed, 
allow estimation of the value of SS and pension plan benefits only after the 
payments are received.6 Thus, wealth in the form of SS and pensions  is re- 
corded only for persons who have begun to receive the payments. Most persons 
have retired by 65 and thereafter are receiving the benefits to which they are 
entitled. About 59 percent of households with reference persons between 65 
and 70 receive pension  benefitst, 89 percent receive SS benefits.  The present 
value of pension and SS wealth is based on life tables together with the amount 
of the annual payments. Social Security benefits are indexed to inflation; pri- 
6. The SIPP data do not contain SS earnings histories (which determine SS benefits), nor do 
they contain detailed pension plan provisions. 16  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
vate pension benefits typically are not.’  As can be seen from figure 1.6A, SS 
and pension wealth is by far the most important component of  the wealth of 
most elderly. Among households with heads age 65-70,  for example, the me- 
dian of SS and pension wealth combined is $1 13,400; the median of housing 
wealth is $38,000, and the median of liquid financial assets is only $10,000. 
The decline in SS and pension wealth with age is largely an artifact of declin- 
ing life expectancy. The lower housing equity of older households is a cohort 
effect and does not reflect a reduction of housing equity as individual house- 
holds age; in fact, housing equity increases on average as the elderly age; there 
is little change in  housing equity even among families that move from one 
home to another. 
Comparison of figures 1.6B and 1.6C shows that households who rent have 
substantially less wealth than homeowners in all asset categories. The median 
total wealth of  homeowners is $170,400; the median for renters is $59,300. 
Renters, who constitute about 20 percent of all households, have virtually no 
liquid assets. 
In summary the majority of elderly households live on Social Security and 
pension benefits. 
Social Security Coverage 
It is clear from figure 1.5A above that the trend toward earlier retirement 
began between the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935 and the Revenue 
Act of 1942. The 1942 Revenue Act granted tax incentives to firms to establish 
pension plans. Indeed, after adjusting for the reduction in agricultural employ- 
ment, there was a sharp reversal in the prior trend toward later retirement, as 
shown by Ransom and Sutch (1988). 
The percentage of persons 65 and older receiving SS benefits increased from 
about 20 percent in 1940 to 85 percent in 1960; now about 95 percent receive 
SS benefits (see fig. 1.7). In addition, the level of benefits has increased sharply. 
The benefits for a retired male worker increased from about 14 percent of me- 
dian male income in  1950 to 37.5 percent in 1980 (see Tuma and Sandefur 
1988). Thus, not only has coverage been extended to virtually the entire labor 
force, but  the standard  of  living that  the benefits  can support has  also in- 
creased sharply. 
Finn Pension Plans 
The proportion of the workforce covered by a firm (or a federal or state or 
local government) pension plan increased from 23.8 to 48.6 percent between 
7. The present values of pension and SS benefits are the discounted survival weighted streams 
of income from each source received by  the reference person and the spouse if  present. Dis- 
counting is at 6 percent, and survival probabilities are calculated from mortality tables by  sex. 
Payments from SS, military pensions, federal employee pensions, and the railroad retirement pen- 
sion are assumed to be indexed at an annual rate of 4 percent. All other sources of pension income 
are not indexed in the wealth calculations. 17  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
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1950 and 1979. Now about 50 percent of the workforce is covered by a pension 
plan. Most of the growth in pension coverage occurred in the 1950s. The pro- 
portion of the older population (55  and older) collecting pension benefits con- 
tinues to increase, as shown in figure 1.8.x  By  1984, 30.8 percent of persons 
55 and older and 39.0 percent of persons 65 and older were collecting pension 
benefits from some sourse, according to the SIPP. 
In short, it is evident that the expansion of SS and firm pension plans has 
allowed and encouraged earlier retirement. In addition to the income incentive 
created by  the entitlement to retirement income, the timing of  the accrual of 
pension entitlements, created by  firm pension plan provisions in particular, 
provides a strong incentive to retire early (as shown in the discussion below). 
These provisions create large increases and decreases in the total compensa- 
tion from working at particular ages. Thus, the retirement benefit inducement 
to retire results from both income and price (wage) effects. 
The Earnings of  Older Employees 
Like the earnings of  younger employees, the earnings of  older workers in- 
creased consistently from 1940 to  1970. But, after 1970, the earnings of  the 
oldest employees began to decline, and the earnings of all older workers were 
declining by  1980 (see fig. 1.9). For example, the average 1985 annual earnings 
of employees 65-69  were about the same in real terms as they were twenty- 
five years earlier, in  1960. The earnings of  employees 55-59  were lower in 
1985 than they were in  1970. These data may be affected by  selective retire- 
ment of the highest-paid employees and by part-time work, but there is ample 
evidence of a general decline in real wages across all age groups in the United 
States since about 1972. Thus, falling real wage earnings may  also have con- 
tributed to earlier retirement in recent years. 
8. Data for fig. 1.8 are taken from Kotlikoff and Smith (1983, tables 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.5.1) 18  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.8  Percentage pension coverage (of all workers 16 and older) and receipt 
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Fig. 1.9  Mean annual earnings of persons 55 and older, with nonzero earnings, 
by age group (thousands of 1984 dollars) 
The Income of the Elderly 
Although the labor force participation rates of older Americans have fallen 
dramatically in recent years, the average income of  the elderly has increased 
sharply. Income data have been tabulated by Hurd and Shoven (1982) for sev- 
eral years between  1963 and 1978 (see figs. l.lOA and B).9 Between 1960 and 
1980, the labor force participation rates of men 65 and older fell by  37.5 per- 
cent, from 31.7 to  19.8. Yet  the incomes of the elderly increased more than 
threefold over approximately the same period. The proportion of income from 
earnings declined, while the proportion  from SS, firm  pension benefits, and 
government medical plans increased substantially. The Hurd and Shoven com- 
9. The Hurd and Shoven data are based on several US.  Bureau of the Census, US.  Department 
of  Health, Education, and Welfare, and Social Security Administration reports and the  1978 Sur- 
vey of  the Elderly. 19  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
Fig. l.lOA  Composition of the income of the elderly 65 and older, selected 
years, excluding Medicare and Medicaid 
Fig. l.lOB  Composition of the income of the elderly, including Medicare and 
Medicaid 
putations include an estimate for the user cost of housing and an estimate for 
the income equivalent of Medicare and Medicaid insurance (valued at cost). 
According to their numbers, the proportion of the income of the elderly derived 
from their own earnings declined from 29 to  18 percent between  1963 and 
1978. Over the same period, the proportion from SS, firm  pension plans, and 
government medical insurance increased from 32 to 51 percent. The propor- 
tion of income from assets remained roughly constant. The Hurd and Shoven 
data are based on mean income by category. Data from Venti and Wise (1991) 
based on median income by category, make it clear that the vast majority of 
the income of most elderly families comes from Social Security and pension 
benefits (see figs. 1.6A-C  above). 20  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Personal saving as a percentage of disposable private income, 
Personal Saving 
Changes in personal saving may also affect retirement decisions. Personal 
saving declined from 3 to 6 percent of disposable private income in the 1950s 
to around  1 percent in the early 1980s, according to computations made by 
Summers and Carroll ( 1987) and reproduced in figure 1.11. These numbers are 
adjusted for inflation and exclude saving by employers through defined-benefit 
pension plans.'O Without the inflation adjustment, the downward trend begins 
only after 1973. It is clear from papers by Venti and Wise (1990, 1991), for 
example, that there is a very large range in personal saving rates, with a large 
proportion  of  the population  saving virtually nothing except in the form of 
housing equity. Thus, the extent to which the aggregate data reflect a reduction 
in saving that could impinge on the retirement decisions of an important pro- 
portion of employees is not clear. In any case, less personal saving, holding 
other income sources constant, would typically be associated with later retire- 
ment, clearly not the dominant force in the current trend. 
Summaly 
The trends discussed above are summarized in figure 1.12. The labor force 
participation of older Americans has declined dramatically since 1940. Social 
Security and pension benefits have become the major source of income for the 
majority of  older persons, and the total income of  persons over 65 has in- 
creased enormously, over threefold between  1963 and  1978 alone. (Real an- 
nual earnings of  the typical employee are about the same now as they were in 
10. The national income accounts include firm contributions to defined-benefit pension plans 
under personal saving. Inflation-adjusted saving is measured saving minus the inflation rate (the 
GNP deflator) times net interest-bearing assets. 21  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
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Fig. 1.12  Summary of trends 
the early 1960s.)  These forces have clearly dominated longer life expectancy 
and lower personal  saving, which would be expected to prolong labor force 
participation. In addition, a fall in real wages since 1970 may have contributed 
to earlier retirement in more recent years. Without some change in labor force 
participation rates of older persons, the prospect is that a smaller segment of 
working persons will support an increasingly larger group of retirees. 
1.3  The Incentive Effects of Public and Private Retirement Plans 
The foregoing discussion highlights the correlates of the reduction in the 
labor force participation rates of older Americans and suggests the conclusion 
that the reduction  was induced by  the introduction  of SS and firm  pension 
plans. The implication is that the adoption of public and private entitlements 
to retirement benefits made early retirement possible; it increased the income 
available to support retirement consumption. The discussion below emphasizes 
the incentive effects inherent in the provisions of public and private plans, in- 
dependent of the retirement wealth that they represent. 
The 1980s have witnessed a marked shift in government policy toward pro- 
moting the labor supply of the elderly, The government has virtually eliminated 
mandatory retirement,  and it has scheduled a gradual increase in the Social 
Security retirement age from 65 to 67. It has limited somewhat the Social Se- 
curity earnings test that reduces Social Security benefits for “retired” workers 
earning more than an “exempt amount,” it eliminated the earnings test after 
age 70, and it is increasing the actuarial incentive to delay the receipt of Social 
Security benefits beyond age 65. 
The change in the government policy  is responsive to the  major  demo- 
graphic swing that is under way and its important implications for retirement 
finances in the next century. Given Social Security’s pay-as-you-go method of 22  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
finance, the projected  increase in  the ratio  of  beneficiaries to contributors 
means either significant cuts in future benefits or significant future increases 
in the Social Security payroll tax. 
Reversing the trend toward early retirement represents an important alterna- 
tive for addressing the demographic transition. Additional labor supply of the 
elderly would relieve Social Security’s finances as well as offset a potential 
shortage in the supply of  labor relative to that of other productive factors. In 
addition, it is argued that prolonging labor force participation would mean 
more fulfilling lives for many elderly. 
What has gone largely unrecognized is that, notwithstanding recent changes 
in Social Security regulations intended to prolong work, private pension plan 
provisions operate powerfully in the opposite direction. The most prominent 
theoretical explanations for the firm behavior rest on the proposition that the 
efficient structure of the age-wage profile is such that older workers are paid 
more than their worth to the firm and must therefore be encouraged to retire 
(see, e.g., Lazear 1979). Whether this is in fact the reason has not been demon- 
strated. Conversations with pension managers reveal that, in some instances, 
the incentives of the plans are not fully understood and that many plans have 
been introduced without consideration of  their effects on retirement. Some 
special early retirement incentives (temporary “window” plans) have been in- 
troduced to relieve the firm of older workers so that younger workers could be 
promoted or simply as a means of reducing the size of the firm’s workforce. 
Many researchers have pointed to the Social Security system’s high benefit 
levels and work disincentives as a major contributor to the continuing trend 
toward early retirement, and a great deal of research has focused on the effect 
of  Social Security benefits on labor force participation. Recent examples are 
Blinder,  Gordon,  and  Wise  (1980),  Burkhauser (1980),  Hurd  and  Boskin 
(1981), Burkhauser and Quinn (1983), Burtless and Moffitt (1984), Hausman 
and Wise (1985), Burtless (1986), and Gustman and Steinmeier (1986, 1991). 
With few exceptions-Hurd  and Boskin (198 1) and, to some extent, Hausman 
and Wise (1985)-these  studies attribute only a modest portion of the early 
retirement trend to the effect of Social Security provisions, although the find- 
ings may reflect, to some degree, problems of misspecification in accounting 
for its effects. In contrast, there has been very little work relating retirement 
behavior to the retirement incentives provided by pension plans.” The apparent 
reason for this neglect has been the difficulty in obtaining data that combine 
the retirement choices of older workers with information about their past earn- 
ings and the specific provisions of their pension plans.12 
More recent work of  Kotlikoff and Wise (1985,  1987, 1989), Stock and 
Wise (1990a, 1990b), and Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1991) suggests that 
11. The most closely related work considers the effect of pension plans on job mobility (Clark 
and McDermed 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier 1993; Allen, Clark, and McDermed  1988, 1993) 
but not retirement. 
12. Exceptions are Burkhauser (1979), Fields and Mitchell (1982), Lazear (1983). Kotlikoff and 
Wise (1987). and Hogarth (1988). 23  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
the provisions of private pension plans are typically much more important than 
SS provisions as determinants of the retirement behavior of workers covered by 
such plans. Their detailed analysis of the provisions of private defined-benefit 
pension plans, which account for roughly three-quarters of  all pension plan 
recipients, indicates that a large proportion of these plans provide very large 
incentives to retire early. Virtually all defined-benefit plans incorporate stiff 
financial penalties for working past the age of 65, and a very sizable fraction 
have similarly stiff penalties for working past the plan’s  early retirement age, 
often as young as 55. Similar evidence is presented by  Bulow (1981), Lazear 
(1983), Clark and McDermed (1986), Fields and Mitchell (1984), and Frant 
and Leonard (1987). Working an additional year often involves losing, in ex- 
pected present value of future pension benefits, an amount equivalent to half a 
year’s nonpension earnings, if not more. These retirement incentives in many, 
if not most, instances are significantly greater than those ascribed to Social Se- 
We  consider first the incentive effects inherent in the SS rules and then the 
curity. 
incentive effects of private pension plans. 
1.3.1  Social Security (SS) 
The SS benefit amount is based on past individual earnings, although the 
relation between benefits and earnings is not linear. Benefits are a much larger 
proportion of the past earnings of low-wage than of high-wage workers. The 
initial benefit is based on nominal earnings indexed to age-60 dollars using the 
consumer price index (CPI). After retirement (receipt of benefits), the benefits 
are indexed to the CPI. The SS normal retirement age is 65. But benefits can 
be taken as young as 62, with the benefit amount actuarially reduced to reflect 
the increase in the expected number of retirement years over which benefits 
will be received. That is, if the benefit entitlement is not changed because of a 
change in earnings, the expected present value of  future benefits is the same 
irrespective of the age, between 62 and 65, at which benefits are first received. 
After age 65, however, the increase in benefits is much less than actuarial. It is 
now 3 percent per year, but it was only 1 percent per year until 1981.13 
The easiest way to understand the incentive effects of  the benefit structure 
is to consider the relation between the present value of future benefits and the 
age of retirement. Such relations are shown in figure 1.13A for two representa- 
tive workers, one a low-wage and the other a high-wage employee. The top 
part of the graph represents nominal earnings by  age (age-50 earnings are in 
1980 dollars). The bottom part of the graph represents the accrual (SSA) of SS 
wealth (SSW). It is the change in the present value of SS benefits between one 
year and the next. That is, 
SSA, = SSW, -  SSW,-,(l + r), 
13. Although the change from 1 to 3 percent was the result of a 1977 law, it applied to  those 
who would be 65 in 1981 and later years. 24  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.13A  Social Security accrual and earnings, representative  low- and high- 
wage workers 
where in this case r is a nominal discount rate taken to be 9 percent. Thus, the 
figure represents two forms of  compensation: one is wage earnings; the other 
is the increase in the entitlement to future SS benefits. 
Social Security accrual is a small proportion of wage earnings for the high- 
wage worker but can be a significant proportion for the low-wage worker, as 
shown in figure 1.13B. It is about 6 percent of  the wage earnings of the low- 
wage worker at age 50 and increases to almost 10 percent at age 62. If the low- 
wage worker continues to work from 62 to 65, the accrual is negative (10 per- 
cent of the wage at 64). The loss in the present value of SS benefits would be 
about 39 percent of wage earnings if the person continued to work past age 65. 
Thus, the reduction in total wage and SS compensation between 62 and 66 
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The reduction in total compensation for the high-wage worker would be about 
14 percent. Thus, the SS inducement to leave the labor force at age 65 is in- 
versely related to wage earnings. 
1.3.2  Firm Pensions 
Roughly three-quarters of all persons participating in private pension plans 
are enrolled in defined-benefit plans where benefits are determined according 
to a specified formula. The remainder are enrolled in plans where benefits are 
directly related to contributions made on behalf of  the employee and to the 
performance of the plan’s investment portfolio. Because most workers are cov- 
ered by  defined-benefit plans, and because they are likely to have the greatest 
effects on labor market behavior, the discussion here emphasizes the incentive 
effects of this type of plan. The evidence is presented in three sections. The 
first section discusses the “average” incentives of a large number of plans. The 
second section discusses the incentives of the plan of  a single large firm and 
relates these incentives to departure rates from the firm. 
The Incentive Effects of Typical Plans 
Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1987) considered the retirement incentive effects 
inherent in typical defined-benefit plans and have analyzed the provisions of a 
large number of  firm plans. As with Social Security, it is easiest to exhibit 
the potential retirement incentive effects of defined-benefit pension plans by 
describing the accrual of vested benefits. Figure 1.14 is taken from Kotlikoff 
and Wise (1987). It shows the average accrual rates (weighted by plan member- 
ship) for U.S. defined-benefit plans with selected early and normal retirement 
ages. The pension accrual in a year is the increase (or decrease) in the expected 26  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.14  Weighted average pension accrual as percentage of wage earnings for 
percentage of earnings plans with ten-year cliff vesting, for selected early and 
normal retirement ages 
discounted value of future pension benefits that results from working that year. 
It is the value of deferred compensation analogous to current wage compensa- 
tion. Pension accrual is shown as a percentage of wage compensation (the ac- 
crual ratio or accrual rate). The data come from a random sample of approxi- 
mately  2,500 plans  from the  Bureau  of  Labor Statistics Level  of  Benefits 
Survey.I4 For each plan, accrual rates are calculated  assuming average wage- 
tenure profiles in the industry and occupation to which the plan pertains, based 
on current population survey data (see Kotlikoff and Wise 1985). 
Consider first plans with early and normal retirement at the same age, 55, a 
plan stipulation that is common in the transportation industry, for example. The 
average decline in the rate of  pension  wealth accrual  at 55 is equivalent to 
about 30 percent of wage earnings. If the typical person covered by such a plan 
were to continue to work through age 65, pension  accrual would be negative 
and equivalent to approximately 30 percent of wage earnings. Whereas at age 
54 the pension benefit accrual is equivalent to about 30 percent of wage earn- 
ings, after age 65 continued work means a loss in pension wealth equivalent to 
about 30 percent of wage earnings. Thus, between these two ages, the decline 
in the rate of  pension  wealth accrual is equivalent to a 60 percent wage re- 
duction! 
The more common plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement 
at 65 typically exhibit an increase in pension  wealth accrual to age 55 with 
a decline thereafter. Again, continued work past age 65 is associated  with a 
substantial loss in pension  wealth, with the decline in accrual equivalent  to 
14. Similar calculations have been made by Lazear (1983) on  the basis of  the Bankers Trust 
Survey of large pension plans. 27  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
-  20 
approximately 20 percent of wage earnings. The pension  wealth of  persons 
covered by plans with both early and normal retirement at 65 increases contin- 
uously until 65 and then declines by approximately 40 percent, from a positive 
accrual of about 21 percent of salary to a negative accrual of about 19 percent. 
Thus, on the basis of  industry-wide earnings profiles,  continued employ- 
ment with the plan sponsor after the age of early retirement and, in particular, 
after the age of normal retirement typically involves a substantial reduction in 
total annual compensation because of declines in pension wealth accrual. 
While figure  1.14 highlights the average characteristics of plans, it is im- 
portant to understand that there is a very wide range in plan provisions, even 
among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages. This is demon- 
strated in figure  1.15, also taken from Kotlikoff and Wise (1987). The figure 
shows average accrual rates for the 513 plans of figure 1.14 with early retire- 
ment at 55 and normal retirement at 65, together with upper and lower 5 per- 
centile levels. The lower 5 percentile level for any age group is that accrual 
rate below which 5 percent of plans fall. The upper 5 percentile level is defined 
analogously. Consider the accrual ratio at vesting. While the average vesting 
ratio for this sample is .071, the median is .021, the maximum is .383, and the 
minimum is 0. The ratio at the lowest 5 percentile point is 0, while it is .201 at 
the largest 5 percentile  level. A  similarly large dispersion in annual accrual 
ratios is indicated for each of the ages 40-70.  The average accrual rates be- 
tween ages 55 and 65 are positive,  but for many plans the rates by  65 are 
very negative. 
Thus, while the average plan may provide positive pension accrual at a par- 
ticular age, the accrual rate may be substantially negative for some plans. Even 
a small proportion of  plans that provide a strong incentive to leave the labor 
-50'  I 
40  45  50  55  60  65  70 
Age 
Fig. 1.15  Weighted average accrual rates and upper and lower 5 percentile 
levels for percentage of earnings plans with ten-year cliff vesting, early 
retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65 28  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
force could have a very substantial effect on observed average labor force par- 
ticipation rates. Thus, it is important to base judgments about the labor force 
participation incentive effects of pension plans on more than average accrual 
rates. 
The Plan of a Large Finn 
Whether incentive effects like those described above have an effect on retire- 
ment decisions is a second question. Kotlikoff and Wise (1985, 1989) have 
addressed this question by considering the relation between pension plan pro- 
visions and retirement rates in a large Fortune 500 firm, referred to as Firm I. 
That work is summarized in this section. The analysis of the firm data shows 
a very strong relation between the plan provisions and departure rates from 
the firm. 
The plan. The plan normal retirement age is 65; the early retirement age is 55. 
Vesting occurs after ten years of  service. The plan is integrated with Social 
Security, with benefits being reduced (offset) by  some proportion of  SS bene- 
fits. Figure 1.16A summarizes the incentive effects inherent in the plan provis- 
ions. The figure shows the pension accrual between ages 50 and 70 of male 
managers hired by the firm in 1960, at age 30. By  1980, they were 50 and had 
twenty years of service with the firm. The accrual of  Social Security benefits 
and predicted wage earnings for each year are also shown. The wage predic- 
tions are based on actual average earnings of firm employees. All the numbers 
are in real 1985 dollars. 
At  age 50, the typical male manager has wage earnings of  about $48,446 
per year. Compensation in the form of pension accrual is $2,646, or about 6 
percent of wage earnings. If the manager were to retire at this age, he would 
be entitled to benefits at 65, based on his earnings in the seven or eight preced- 
ing years. The benefits would not be available until age 65 and thus have  a 
relatively low present value at age 50. Normal retirement benefits could be 
taken earlier, as early as age 55, but they would be reduced actuarially in such 
a way that the present discounted value of the benefits remains unchanged. The 
reduction in the benefit would be just enough to offset the fact that benefits 
would be received for more years.15 
If  the person remains in the firm until age 55 and then retires, however, 
benefits are available immediately, and the reduction in benefits for early retire- 
ment is less than the actuarial reduction. In addition, the worker who remains 
until age 55 and then retires is eligible to receive a supplemental benefit until 
age 65 equal to his Social Security offset. Thus, there is a very large increase 
in pension wealth at age 55, $72,527, corresponding to the large spike in the 
graph. In effect, there is a bonus of $72,527 for remaining in the firm from age 
54 to age 55. 
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After age 55, pension accrual falls, to about 10 percent of the wage at age 
60.16 Pension accrual is in fact negative beginning at age 61. The loss in com- 
pensation between age 60 and age 61 is equivalent to a wage cut of about 14 
percent. Between age 61 and age 65, the loss in pension benefits is equivalent 
to about 20 percent of annual wage compensation. Workers who have thirty or 
more years of  service at age 60 are eligible for full retirement benefits; the 
early retirement reduction factors no -longer  apply. 





16. The plan provisions stipulate that an additional year of  service adds 2 percent to normal 
retirement benefits per year of  service before age 55 but only  1 percent per year of  service after 
age 55. 
17. Thus, no increase in benefits will result for working another year from the application of 
one less year of early retirement reduction, as was the case before thirty years of service. In addi- 30  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.16B 
representative person in Firm I 
Cumulative earnings, pension wealth, and Social Security wealth, 
Social Security accruals range from about $1,000 to $8,000 between age 50 
and  age  65.  After  65,  Social  Security  accrual  becomes  negative,  about 
-$8,500  at age 66. At 66, the loss in private pension benefits and Social Secu- 
rity benefits together amounts to about 32 percent of wage earnings at that age. 
(For some groups of  employees in the firm, the loss in pension and Social 
Security wealth together after age 65 is equivalent to 95 percent of wage earn- 
ings: if  these employees continue to work, it is essentially without compen- 
sation.) 
The data in figure 1.16A are shown in the standard budget constraint form 
in figure 1.16B. Total compensation, including wage earnings, Social Security 
wealth, and pension wealth, is graphed against age, beginning at age 50. There 
is a discontinuous jump in the graph at age 55, the age at which early retire- 
ment benefits are available on an advantageous basis. 
TheJim  departure rates. Departure rates by age and years of service suggest 
the effect of pension plan provisions on retirement. They are shown for sales- 
men by  age and years of service in table 1.1. The yearly departure rate is the 
proportion of those employed at the beginning of the year that retires-more 
strictly speaking, leaves the firm-during  the forthcoming year. Several as- 
tion, for each year that benefits are not taken between ages 55 and 65, the receipt of benefits for a 
year without the Social Security offset (reduction) is forgone. This advantage is lost at age 65. 
Thereafter, the loss in benefits from working an  additional year is smaller because this opportunity 
is no longer available; it was available only until age 65.  The accruals also depend to a small extent 
on the updating of the years used in the calculation of “final” earnings. “Final” earnings are used 
to determine the pension benefit. 31  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
Table 1.1  Departure Rates for Salesmen by Age and Years of Service 
Years of Service 
Age  < 10  11-15  16-20  21-25  26-30  31-35  36i 
< 50  19 
50-54  14 
'55  I1 
56-59  14 
60  11 
61  13 
62  12 
63  20 
64  0 
65  34 
66  17 







































































pects of the data stand out. (1) Before 55, departure rates are typically around 
3 percent for vested employees; they are substantially larger for those with 
fewer than ten years of service, who are not vested. At 55, the early retirement 
age, they jump to  10 percent or more, but only for vested employees, those 
with at least ten years of  service. It is important to notice that the departure 
rates stay at that level until age 60, when there is another jump in the rate of 
departure. (2) At age 60, the departure rates increase very precipitously, espe- 
cially for persons with over thirty years of service. For this group, full benefits 
are available because there is no longer an early retirement reduction according 
to the plan's  rules. For this group, subsequent pension accrual is negative. (3) 
When  Social Security benefits become available at 62, the departure rates 
again increase very sharply, but only for those who are vested in the firm plan. 
(4) Finally, there is a large increase in departure rates at 65, the SS normal 
retirement age. Both pension and SS accruals are negative if  the employee 
continues to work beyond age 65. 
To understand the potential importance of the early retirement benefits, sup- 
pose that, if  it were not for this inducement, the departure rates would remain 
at 3 percent until age 60 instead of the 10 or 12 percent rates that are observed. 
Departure at 3 percent per year means that 14 percent of those who were em- 
ployed at 55 would have left before age 60; at 11 percent per year, 44 percent 
would leave between 55 and 59. 
Cumulative departure rates for all employees are shown in table 1.2 for three 
years, together with the rates by  age. The cumulative rates are one minus the 
percentage who have departed. Given employment at age 50, the cumulative 
rates show the percentage still employed at older ages. On the basis of the 1981 
and 1983 departure rates, only 48 percent of those employed at 50 would still 32  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
Table 1.2  Cumulative and Yearly Departure Rates by Calendar Year, Years of 
Service (YOS), and Age 
Yearly 
11+ YOS  Cumulative, 11  + YOS 
8-10  YOS, 





























































































































be employed at 60, and then 17 percent of these would leave. Only 10 percent 
would remain until age 65, and then about 50 percent of these would leave. 
These data also show the effect of  a special early retirement incentive (a 
“window plan”) that was in effect in 1982 only. For employees who were eli- 
gible for early retirement in 1982, the incentive program provided a bonus of 
up to one year’s  salary. It is clear that the effect of  the incentive was large: 
while the departure rates for 1981 and for 1983 are virtually identical, the 1982 
rates were much higher. For example, the departure rate for 60-year-olds was 
17 percent in 1981 and 1983 but 29 percent in 1982. Of those employed at age 
50,40 percent would still have been employed after age 60, based on the 1981 
and 1983 departure rates. Only 27 percent would remain after age 60, based 
on the 1982 rates. Even under the normal plan, only 10 percent of those em- 
ployed at age 50 would still be employed at 65. Only 2 percent would remain 
until 65 with the special incentive. 
1.4  An Option Value Model of Retirement 
The previous section demonstrates the large incentive effects inherent in the 
provisions of  defined-benefit pension plans and shows that these incentives 
have very substantial effects on firm retirement (and other departure) rates. An 33  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
additional goal of  research in this area is to predict the effect on retirement 
rates of changes in firm pension plan and SS provisions. This section discusses 
an econometric model of retirement and simulations based on this model. 
1.4.1  The Model 
Two  basic approaches, in addition to least squares regression, have  been 
used in recent years to analyze retirement behavior. The first is the method of 
estimation developed to analyze the choices of individuals who face discontin- 
uous or kinked budget constraints. The central feature of  this method is a life- 
time budget constraint analogous to the standard labor-leisure budget con- 
straint, but  with  annual hours  of  work  replaced  by  years  of  labor  force 
participation and annual earnings replaced by  cumulative lifetime compensa- 
tion. The optimal age of retirement is determined by a utility function defined 
over years of work (postretirement years of leisure) and cumulative compensa- 
tion. A careful application of this approach to retirement is by Burtless (1986), 
who analyzed the effects of changes in Social Security benefits on retirement.18 
While appealing in many respects, this procedure has an important drawback. 
It implicitly assumes that individuals know with certainty the opportunities- 
like wage rates-that  will be available to them in the distant future. The hazard 
model  is the second approach. As implemented to date, it is essentially a 
reduced-form technique designed to capture the effects on retirement of move- 
ments in variables such as Social Security wealth. Implementations of the haz- 
ard model have  not been as “forward looking” as the nonlinear budget con- 
straint  specification^.'^  On the other hand, unexpected shocks, like sudden 
changes in earnings, enter the analysis very naturally. 
The option value model as specified by Stock and Wise (1990b) incorporates 
the advantages of both of the approaches described above. It allows updating of 
information, as does the traditional hazard model, but also considers potential 
compensation many years in the future, as does the nonlinear budget constraint 
approach.20  The key  ideas of  the model can be summarized briefly. It is in- 
18. An analogous model was used by  Venti and Wise (1984) to describe the rent paid by low- 
income families faced with discontinuous budget constraints. Earlier papers that develop these 
techniques are Hausman and Wise (1980) and Burtless and Hausman (1978). 
19. Thus, in Hausman and Wise (1985), e.g., changes from the current period to the next, in 
earnings, pension wealth, and the increment to pension wealth, are allowed to affect the decision 
to retire in the next period, but expectations of these values several years hence are not. 
20. Antecedents of the Stock and Wise model begin with Lazear and Moore (1988). who argue 
that the option value of postponing retirement is the appropriate variable to enter in a regression 
equation explaining retirement. Indeed, it was their work and the analysis of military retirement 
rates by  Phillips and Wise (1987) that motivated Stock and Wise to pursue this approach. The 
Stock and Wise model is close in spirit to the stochastic dynamic programming model of Rust 
(1989), which poses substantially greater numerical complexity than the Stock and Wise model 
and has not yet been estimated for retirement. In principle, Rust observes not only the individual’s 
retirement age but subsequent consumption decisions as well. Thus, Rust’s model allows the indi- 
vidual to optimize over age of retirement and future consumption jointly. The individual’s decision 
is modeled as the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem. As in the Stock and 
Wise case, the individual’s expectations are conditioned on current known variables such as in- 34  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
tended to capture an important empirical regularity, the irreversibility  of the 
retirement  decision.  Although  it is  not  uncommon  to  work-at  least  part- 
time-after  “retirement,” it is rare to return  to the job from which one has 
retired. The model focuses on the opportunity cost of retiring or, equivalently, 
on the value of  retaining the option to retire at a later date. It has two key 
aspects. The first is that a person will continue to work at any age if the option 
value of continuing work is greater than the value of immediate retirement. In 
effect, the person compares the best of expected future possibilities-the  op- 
tion value of continuing to work-with  the value of retiring now. The second 
is that the individual reevaluates this retirement decision as more information 
about future earnings-and  thus future retirement benefits-becomes  avail- 
able with age. For example, a decline in the wage between age 56 and age 57 
will cause the individual to reassess future wage earnings and thus future pen- 
sion benefits and Social Security accrual as well. Thus, retirement may seem 
more advantageous on reaching 57 than it was expected to be at age 56. Retire- 
ment occurs when the value of  continuing work falls below the value of  re- 
tiring. 
come. The idea is to recover the parameters of a utility function specified in terms of these choice 
variables. In practice, however, Rust uses income to describe consumption (Rust  1988).  with a 
value function similar to that of Stock and Wise, specified in terms of income. To  simplify the 
solution to the dynamic programming problem in his model, Rust assumes that random unob- 
served individual components are independent over time, whereas Stock and  Wise allow such 
terms (representing diffcrenccs among individuals in health status, desire for leisure, and the like) 
to be correlated. In short, Rust has described a solution to a more complicated choice than Stock 
and Wise, but with uncorrelated errors, whereas the Stock and Wise model is a solution to a less 
complex problem, but with correlated errors. A “dynamic programming” model of employment 
behavior has also been proposed by  Berkovec and Stem (1991). Berkovec and Stern’s analysis is 
also in progress. They consider transitions among three employment states over time. To simplify 
the solution to their optimization problem, they assume that disturbance terms are uncorrelated 
over time, except for an individual-specific random effect. Their analysis is in terms of individual 
attributes like education, race, health status, and age. Government benefits like Social Security are 
not explicitly modeled, whereas these benefits, as well as firm  pension benefits, play the central 
role in the Stock and Wise analysis. Stock and Wise estimate a discount or weighting factor, 
whereas they obtain estimates of other parameters conditional on an assumed discount rate. Age 
itself is used explicitly to estimate retirement. Age is not a direct determinant of  retirement in the 
standard version of the Stock and Wise model. This has important implications if the model is to 
be used to predict the effect of  changes in  firm pension plan or Social Security provisions on 
retirement. Neither Rust nor Berkovec and Stem, however, have information on private pension 
plan provisions, the focus of the Stock and Wise analysis. The retirement decision rule proposed 
by Stock and Wise as an approximation to individual behavior is much simpler than the dynamic 
programming rule. A concomitant of this assumption is also much simpler econometric implemen- 
tation than the burdensome calculations imposed by the dynamic programming rule. These simpli- 
fications reduce the computational requirements  substantially while retaining the key  foward- 
looking features of  the dynamic programming  approach. Of  course, both of  these  models are 
theoretical abstractions. The important consideration is which decision rule is the better approxi- 
mation to the calculations that govern actual individual behavior. The answer to this question will 
have to await further analysis. Stock and Wise show that the rule that they assume predicts individ- 
ual choices well, but the predictive validities of the alternative decision rules have not been com- 
pared. 35  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
Cumulative  Departure Rate). 
1 







50  52  54  56  58  60  62  64  66 
Age 
Fig. 1.17  Simulation: Increase firm early retirement age from 55 to 60 
1.4.2  Simulations of the Effect of Changes in Pension and SS Provisions 
To illustrate the potential to affect retirement behavior through changes in 
pension and SS provisions, three simulations from Stock and Wise (1990a) 
and one from Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1991) are discussed here. 
Increase the Firm Early Retirement Age  from 55 to 60 
The effect of increasing the firm’s early retirement age from 55 to 60, leav- 
ing other provisions as they were, is shown in figure 1.17. Under the current 
plan, 65 percent of those employed at 50 have left before age 60. Only 42 
percent would have left before age 60 if early retirement had been at 60 instead 
of  at 55. Only  13.6 percent of  employees leave between 55 and 59 if  early 
retirement is at 60, whereas 45.5 percent leave between these ages under the 
current system. On the other hand, because the early retirement “bonus” is now 
farther in the future, more employees leave the firm between 50 and 54. This 
is the result of  the greater weight given to current versus future income. In 
short, many more workers would be employed between the ages of 57 and 65 
if the early retirement age were 60 instead of 55. 
Increase the SS Early Retirement Reduction Factor 
Social Security benefits can be taken beginning at age 62, but the current 
Social Security rules include a benefit reduction of  Y9 percent per month of 
retirement before age 65.2’ The simulated effect of  increasing the reduction 
factor to 1 percent per month is shown in figure 1.18. It is clear that the effect 
of  this change is small relative to the effect of  the change in the firm early 
retirement age. This is primarily because only a small fraction of firm employ- 
ees are still working at age 62-only  21 percent in the base case. The retire- 
21. This reduction is intended to be actuarially fair. 36  Robin L. Lumsdaine and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 1.18  Simulation: Increase Social Security early retirement reduction factor 
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Fig. 1.19  Simulation: Increase Social Security retirement ages by one year 
ment rates of those still employed at age 62, however, are considerably lower- 
about 14 percent-with  the higher reduction factor. They are also lower at 63. 
Still, the net result on the employment of persons covered by the firm's pension 
plan is negligible. 
Increase the SS  Retirement Ages by One Year 
Current plans are to increase the Social Security retirement age from 65 to 
67 by  2027. To judge the effect of  such a change on workers with pension 
plans like the one in this firm, Stock and Wise (1990a) simulated the effect of 
increasing the normal retirement age from 65 to 66 and the early retirement 
age from 62 to 63. The results are shown in figure 1.19. Again, the effect on 37  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
the retirement rates of persons in this firm is small. This is true even though 
the effect on the annual retirement rates of 62- and 65-year-olds is substantial. 
The retirement rate of 62-year-olds is reduced from 33.9 to 25.2 percent. The 
rate at 65 is reduced from 28.6 to 25.1. But only a few workers remain in the 
firm to be affected by these changes. 
The Effect of a Special Window Plan 
During 1982, the firm had a special retirement incentive program (a “win- 
dow” plan) that provided up to one year’s salary, in addition to regular retire- 
ment benefits, for employees who retired in that year. The effects of this plan 
on the retirement behavior of nonmanagerial office workers were simulated by 
Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1991) and are shown in figure 1.20. For compari- 
son, the figure shows retirement rates in  1981 and then actual and simulated 
retirement rates in 1982. (Evidence on the effects of this plan is also shown in 
table 1.2 above.) It is clear that the plan had a very large effect. Annual depar- 
ture rates were more than doubled for many age groups. In addition, the figure 
indicates the extent to which the option value model was able to predict the 
effect of this exogenous change in “retirement benefits.” 
1.5  Summary 
The labor force participation of older Americans has declined dramatically 
since the inception of Social Security and the tax inducement to develop firm 
pension plans. Between 1937 and 1980, the participation rate of men over 60 
fell from about 62 to about 32 percent, and it continues to decline. Even the 
rate for older women has declined since 1970. It seems evident that the decline 
has resulted from the retirement income made possible by these programs. The 
vast majority of  the income of  most retirees now  comes from pension and 
Social Security benefits. Most retirement-age families have almost no personal 
saving other than housing wealth. Yet the average income of older families has 
increased dramatically in the past three decades, possibly threefold between 
1963 and 1978 alone. With reference to figure 1.1 above, the retirement bene- 
fits curve has been raised. From the point of view of the individual, the wealth 
associated with SS and firm pension benefits encourages earlier retirement. 
But it is not only the amount of the SS and pension wealth that matters. How 
it accumulates is also important. For example, if  no benefits were available 
until age 70, few employees would retire at age 55. If retirement wealth accu- 
mulates rapidly between 55 and 60 and then starts to decline, employees have 
an incentive to retire soon after age 60. In effect, the reduction in the accumula- 
tion of retirement wealth is like a reduction in the wage; both reduce the incen- 
tive for labor force participation. In fact, the formulas determining firm pen- 
sion benefits in particular tend to encourage continued employment with the 
firm until some age-often  between 55 and 60-and  provide an incentive to 







*  Actual 1982  /I  ,I 
,’  ./ 
Actual 1981  - 






0-  - 
or even negative. The addition to retirement wealth after age 65 is almost al- 
ways negative. The amount of  the retirement benefit is not increased enough 
for a person who retires one year later to offset the fact that the benefit  is 
received for one year less. 
Thus, even though individuals are living longer, and even though a larger 
fraction of the population is old, workers are leaving the labor force at younger 
and younger ages. The retired portion of the population is increasing; the em- 
ployed portion is declining. Whether by intent or by happenstance, firm pen- 
sion plan and Social Security provisions continue to encourage this trend. 39  Aging and Labor Force Participation 
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